# Write this game in normal form.

January 4, 2018
###### When both firms announce the regular price, each company attracts only its 1,500 loyal customers and the firms each earn \$4,500 in profits. If you were in charge of pricing at one of these firms, would you have a clear-cut pricing strategy? If so, explain why. If not, explain why not and propose a mechanism that might solve your dilemma
January 4, 2018

In a two-player, one-shot, simultaneous-move game, each player can choose strategy A or strategy B. If both players choose strategy A, each earns a payoff of \$400. If both players choose strategy B, each earns a payoff of \$200. If player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy B, then player 1 earns \$100 and player 2 earns \$600. If player 1 chooses strategy B and player 2 chooses strategy A, then player 1 earns \$600 and player 2 earns \$100.

a. Write this game in normal form.

b. Find each player’s dominant strategy, if it exists.

c. Find the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.

d. Rank strategy pairs by aggregate payoff (highest to lowest).

e. Can the outcome with the highest aggregate payoff be sustained in equilibrium? Why or why not?